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1343 
HOARDERS: CLARIFYING FERC’S POLICY, AS 
ARTICULATED IN ORDER NO. 888, AGAINST 
WITHHOLDING ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION 
CAPACITY  
INTRODUCTION  
Adopted in 1998 with the express goal of curbing undue discrimination1 
in the interstate market for electric transmission, Order No. 8882 has been 
referred to as the single largest step taken by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC or the Commission)3 to foster competition in the 
market for wholesale electric transmission.4 Among its key features, Order 
No. 888 requires a utility5 within FERC’s jurisdiction6 to separate its 
 
 
 1. Generally speaking, unduly discriminatory practices fall under two umbrellas. If a utility 
operates in an industry that has little to no competition, the utility discriminates unduly when it charges 
different rates to customers that impose similar costs of service on the utility. Where competition 
seemingly exists, rate disparities that have anti-competitive effects are considered unduly 
discriminatory. Under respective circumstances, treating dissimilar customers dissimilarly and charging 
rates that have no anti-competitive effects would be considered examples of “due discrimination,” which 
is permissible under FERC precedent. The purpose of the distinction between “due” and undue 
discrimination is to prevent a utility that possesses the power to alter rates in a market where customers 
have no reasonable opportunity to obtain service from a different utility from abusing such power. See 
SCOTT HEMPLING, REGULATING PUBLIC UTILITY PERFORMANCE: THE LAW OF MARKET STRUCTURE, 
PRICING AND JURISDICTION 301–02 (2013).  
 2. Order No. 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and 
Transmitting Utilities, 75 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,080 (1996) [hereinafter Order No. 888], 
https://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/land-docs/rm95-8-00w.txt. 
 3. FERC is “an independent agency that regulates the interstate transmission of natural gas, oil, 
and electricity. FERC also regulates natural gas and hydropower projects.” About FERC, FERC (Jan. 
26, 2017), http://www.ferc.gov/about/about.asp.  
 4. Gregory N. Basheda et al., The FERC, Stranded Cost Recovery, and Municipalization, 19 
ENERGY L.J. 351, 351–52 (1998); see also Entergy Servs., Inc. v. FERC, 375 F.3d 1204, 1205–06 (D.C. 
Cir. 2004) (describing Order No. 888 as the culmination of a “massive regulatory revision” by FERC); 
William H. Penniman & Paul B. Turner, A Jurisdictional Clash Over Electricity Transmission: Northern 
States Power v. FERC, 20 ENERGY L.J. 205, 205–06 (1999) (footnotes omitted) (“Orders No. 888 and 
889 . . . marked the most sweeping revision of the FERC’s regulation of electric utilities’ transmission 
services since the enactment of Part 2 of the Federal Power Act (FPA) in the 1930s.”). 
 5. The Federal Power Act defines an “electric utility” as “a person or Federal or State agency . . 
. that sells electric energy.” 16 U.S.C. § 796(22)(A) (2012). Specifically, a “transmitting utility” includes 
any electric utility “that owns, operates, or controls facilities used for the transmission of electric energy 
(A) in interstate commerce; (B) for the sale of electric energy at wholesale.” Id. § 796(23).  
 6. “The Federal Power Act splits jurisdiction over the electricity system between the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), which regulates the wholesale market and transmission, and 
state regulators, which have authority over retail markets.” Recent Case, Electric Power Supply Ass’n 
v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216 (D.C. Cir. 2014), 128 HARV. L. REV. 1518, 1518 (2014). FERC regulation was 
necessitated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island v. 
Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927). See Matthew R. McGuire, Comment, 
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transmission function7 from its wholesale merchant function8 and to charge 
separate rates for each of the services.9 The Order also requires any public 
utility that “own[s], control[s] or operate[s] transmission facilities which 
transmit electricity in interstate commerce to file with the FERC open 
access transmission tariffs.”10 These open access tariffs cannot be 
discriminatory or anticompetitive.11 Rather, the tariffs must “offer third 
parties access on the same or comparable basis, and under the same or 
comparable terms and conditions, as the transmission provider’s use of its 
system.”12  
As such, Order No. 888 reflects a marked departure from the regulatory 
approach FERC has traditionally taken.13 Its successors, Orders No. 888-
 
 
(Mis)understanding “Undue Discrimination”: FERC’s Misguided Effort to Extend the Boundaries of 
the Federal Power Act, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 549, 553 (2012) (noting that the Attleboro decision 
provided that states “could not interfere with the interstate transmission of electricity”). This decision 
created a gap in regulation “because no federal body had the authority to regulate interstate electric 
transmission” at the time. Id. 
 7. Transmission is sometimes characterized as the “‘interstate highway’ of electricity delivery” 
as it involves the bulk movement of high voltage power over long distances. See e.g., Transmission & 
Distribution, PJM LEARNING CTR., https://learn.pjm.com/electricity-basics/transmission-
distribution.aspx (last visited Jan. 28, 2017). Via transmission lines, electricity is moved from generation 
facilities “to substations [that are] closer to areas of demand for electricity.” Id. The electricity is 
subsequently transported through smaller “distribution lines that carry the [electricity] to consumers” 
such as homes and businesses. Glossary, FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/resources/ glossary.asp. A 
utility’s transmissions functions therefore include “the planning, directing, organizing or carrying out of 
day-to-day transmission operations, including the granting and denying of transmission service 
requests.” PACIFICORP, STANDARDS OF CONDUCT COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES 2 (Dec. 2016), 
http://www.oasis.oati.com/PPW/PPWdocs/socmanual.pdf. 
 8. Idaho Power Co. v. FERC, 312 F.3d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Wholesale merchant functions 
encompass the activities associated with the interstate sale of electricity to third parties that ultimately 
resell such energy to consumers. See TRI-STATE GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION ASSOCIATION, INC., 
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT CONCERNING OPEN ACCESS AND NON-DISCRIMINATORY TRANSMISSION 
SERVICES 1 (May 2001), http://www.oatioasis.com/TSGT/ TSGTdocs/ts_stand_conduct.pdf.  
 9. Ala. Mun. Elec. Auth. v. FERC, 662 F.3d 571, 574 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  
 10. Alan I. Robbins & Stacy D. Gould, Traditional Municipalization and Duplication of Facilities 
Cases: Background, Facts, and Status, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 155, 156 (1997).  
 11. MONICA GREER, ELECTRICITY COST MODELING CALCULATIONS 84 (2011).  
 12. STEVE ISSER, ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING IN THE UNITED STATES: MARKETS AND POLICY 
FROM THE 1978 ENERGY ACT TO THE PRESENT 137 (2015) (explaining FERC’s first attempt to impose a 
comparability standard on the electric utility industry in 1993). 
 13. See Penniman & Turner, supra note 4, at 207.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/9
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A,14 B, 15 C, 16 and Orders No. 88917 and 890,18 clarify and expand upon 
many of the policies articulated in Order No. 888. Among the articulated 
policies of Order No. 888, the FERC outlaws capacity hoarding.19  
There are two issues associated with FERC’s treatment of capacity 
hoarding under Order No. 888. The first is that the Commission never 
explicitly defines the concept. The second issue rests on the Commission’s 
failure to identify a clear and transparent approach to policing hoarding (in 
the context of transmission capacity reservations).20 In Order No. 888, 
FERC summarily refused to adopt a use-it-or-lose-it approach to regulating 
transmission customers who reserve capacity.21 This decision needs to be 
expressly revisited in light of changes to the electric utility landscape.  
Part I provides a brief historical background of the electric utility 
industry, with an emphasis on significant changes that occurred prior to the 
adoption of Order No. 888. It segues through the traditional vertically 
integrated utility model and the concept of natural monopolies to reach the 
 
 
 14. Order No. 888-A, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities 
and Transmitting Utilities, 78 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,220 (1997) [hereinafter Order No. 888-A], 
https://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/land-docs/rm95-8p1-000.txt. Order 888-A “addressed petitions 
for clarification and rehearing relating to [Order No. 888].” Fla. Mun. Power Agency v. FERC, 411 F.3d 
287, 289 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 15. Order No. 888-B, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public 
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 81 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,248 (1997) (affirming, “with certain clarifications, 
the fundamental calls made in Order No. 888-A”). 
 16. Order No. 888-C, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public 
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 82 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,046 (1998) (clarifying “that the primary goal of 
Order No. 888’s requirements for pooling arrangements ‘is to ensure comparability regarding 
transmission services that are offered on a pool-wide basis.’”). For a brief explanation of pooling 
arrangements, see infra note 112.  
 17. Order No. 889 has been described as “establishing guidelines to limit affiliate coordination or 
favoritism in the administration of open access tariffs.” Harvey Reiter, The Contrasting Policies of the 
FCC and FERC Regarding the Importance of Open Transmission Networks in Downstream Competitive 
Markets, 57 FED. COMM. L.J. 243, 259 (2005). 
 18. Order No. 890, Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, 118 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,119 (Feb. 16, 2007); see 2011 A.B.A. SEC. ENV’T, ENERGY & RESOURCES L. REP. 181 
(“Order No. 890 required each public utility transmission provider to develop an open-access 
transmission tariff (OATT) and transmission planning process that satisfied nine principles: ‘(1) 
coordination, (2) openness, (3) transparency, (4) information exchange, (5) comparability, (6) dispute 
resolution, (7) regional participation, (8) economic planning studies, and (9) cost allocation for new 
projects.’”). The Order was designed to address, inter alia, “the potential for undue discrimination in the 
planning of transmission facilities.” James J. Hoecker & Douglas W. Smith, Regulatory Federalism and 
Development of Electric Transmission: A Brewing Storm?, 35 ENERGY L.J 71, 76 (2014) (emphasis 
added). 
 19. See discussion infra Part II.b.  
 20. See discussion infra Part I.d.  
 21. See discussion infra Part II.b.  
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Commission’s fight against what FERC considers the foremost barrier to 
competition, undue discrimination. In doing so, Part I contextualizes many 
of the issues raised by this Note. Part II addresses the current need for 
reform. It begins by arguing that FERC’s hoarding policy, as described in 
Order No. 888, lacks both clarity and transparency. It contends that with 
rising mergers and acquisitions activity within the utility industry, FERC 
should expressly revisit its treatment of hoarding. Part III is concerned with 
establishing a comprehensive definition for capacity hoarding. Ultimately it 
defines capacity hoarding as “an electric utility’s retention of transmission 
capacity when such utility possesses market power or otherwise has an 
intention to exert market power through its retention of such capacity.” 
After establishing the definition, Part III concludes by suggesting that FERC 
adopt a modified use-it-or-lose-it approach to address hoarding. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Impetus Towards Increasing Competition/Decreasing Discrimination 
Energy law’s main objective has consistently been “to provide an 
abundant, stable energy supply at a low price.”22 The traditional utility 
model in the United States was the vertically integrated monopoly23 that 
provided a bundled24 service and charged its customers “a single price for 
generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity.”25 This system of 
nationwide vertically integrated utilities “began to unravel” in the latter half 
of the 20th century, as “electricity prices precipitously climbed, and the 
massive capital investments that utilities had been sinking into their systems 
came under heightened political scrutiny.”26 Simultaneously, numerous 
academic studies began encouraging reform.27 The Commission considered 
 
 
 22. Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 
1339, 1346 (2010) (explaining that the “central objective” has remained consistent despite changes to 
the regulatory landscape). 
 23. A vertically integrated electric utility generates power and transports it as well. ROBERT J. 
MICHAELS, CATO INST., VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE U.S. ELECTRICITY 
INDUSTRY 2 (2006), http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/Michaels_vertical_integration_07.06.pdf 
(explaining that electric utilities have been vertically integrated “almost since their origins”). 
 24. Bundled services consist of generation, transmission, distribution, and ancillary services 
bundled into one package and sold to an end-user. See SHIMON AWERBUCH & ALISTAIR PRESTON, THE 
VIRTUAL UTILITY: ACCOUNTING, TECHNOLOGY & COMPETITIVE ASPECTS OF THE EMERGING 
INDUSTRY 252 (1997).  
 25. Cal. Dep’t of Water Res. v. FERC, 489 F.3d 1029, 1031 (9th Cir. 2007). See supra notes 7–8 
for an explanation of generation, transmission, and distribution.  
 26. Davies, supra note 22, at 1348.  
 27. Id.; see, e.g., Philip R. O’Connor et al., The Transition to Competition in the Electric Utility 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/9
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the apparent lack of competition (under the traditional system)28 to be an 
underlying cause of a growing problem: pervasive discrimination within the 
industry.29  
B. The Importance of Competition and the Natural Monopoly 
Competition is a relatively new addition to the electric utility 
landscape.30 Historically, electric utilities have been considered natural 
monopolies.31 A natural monopoly “is not like other businesses subject to 
the steady, constant pressure of competition.”32 In his article, Natural 
Monopoly and Its Regulation, Richard Posner explains the concept of a 
natural monopoly.  
The term does not refer to the actual number of sellers in a market 
but to the relationship between demand and the technology of supply. 
If the entire demand within a relevant market can be satisfied at the 
lowest cost by one firm rather than by two or more, the market is a 
natural monopoly, whatever the actual number of firms in it. If such 
a market contains more than one firm, either the firms will quickly 
shake down to one through mergers or failures, or production will 
continue to consume more resources than necessary.33 
Essentially, “[a] natural monopoly exists when a single firm can produce a 
desired level of output at lower total cost than any output combination of 
more than one firm.”34 Under such conditions, a government might grant a 
 
 
Industry, 8 J. ENERGY L. & POL’Y 223, 224 (1988) (emphasis added) (criticizing the framework that 
regulated electric utilities as “built in the first forty years of [the twentieth] century, without any 
precedent, and structured to adapt to the changing environment of that time.”). 
 28. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 5 (2002) (explaining that around the time the FPA passed, 
“[c]ompetition among utilities was not prevalent”).  
 29. See discussion infra Part I.c.  
 30. See generally SALLY HUNT, MAKING COMPETITION WORK IN ELECTRICITY (2002). 
 31. AMY ABEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32728, ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATORY REFORM: 
ISSUES FOR THE 109TH CONGRESS 1 (2005).  
 32. RICHARD T. ELY ASSISTED BY JOHN H. FINLEY, TAXATION IN AMERICAN STATES AND CITIES 
269 (New York, Thomas Y. Crowley & Co. 1888). “In a perfectly competitive market, firms expand 
output to the point where price equals incremental cost—the cost of producing an additional unit of their 
product. A monopolist, if unregulated, curtails production in order to raise prices.” STEPHEN BREYER, 
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15 (1982) (footnote omitted). “A perfectly competitive market assumes 
. . . a firm faces many buyers and sellers in the market, all firms and buyers have equal access to 
information, the costs of transaction between any seller and buyer are extremely low, and there are no 
significant impediments to market entry . . . .” FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 51–52 (3d ed. 2010) (explaining market assumption of the neoclassical economic view 
of competition).  
 33. Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548 (1969). 
 34. Douglas Gegax & Kenneth Nowotny, Competition and the Electric Utility Industry: An 
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single firm a monopoly franchise to provide the particular service to 
customers.35 Granting a monopoly franchise within an industry that is 
inherently monopolistic36 typically results from a finding that the service 
sought to be provided is essential to the public.37 Governmental entities then 
regulate the franchised monopoly to prevent it “from earning excess profits 
at the expense of the consumer.”38 
Electric utility companies were long considered natural monopolies for 
three main reasons. First, it was understood that the most economical way 
to transmit and distribute electricity was typically over “a single line or a 
single network of lines.”39 Second, such generation of electricity had to be 
“centrally dispatched (usually by computer programs) to meet both 
predictable changes and unforeseen contingencies.”40 This requirement 
resulted due to the infeasibility of storing electricity.41 Third, the service 
rendered by electric utilities was inextricably linked to the public interest.42 
The characteristics above led to a system of vertically integrated 
utilities43 whose rates were heavily regulated by both the states44 and the 
federal government.45 The aim of such regulation was to set utility rates just 
 
 
Evaluation, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 63, 67 (1993). 
 35. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 4; see also Ariel Katz, The Potential Demise of 
Another Natural Monopoly: Rethinking the Collective Administration of Performing Rights, 1 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 541, 552 (2005) (explaining that such conditions make it “optimal, from a cost 
perspective, to have only one firm”). 
 36. “Whether a particular market is a natural monopoly market . . . has occupied regulators for a 
century.” HEMPLING, supra note 1, at 16.  
 37. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877) (finding that the rates charged by grain storage 
facilities were subject to regulation because such facilities were affected with the public interest).  
 38. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 4; see also Katz, supra note 35, at 552 (explaining that 
natural monopolies are routinely “subject[ed] . . . to some form of regulation, in order to ensure socially 
desirable outcomes when competition cannot be relied upon to achieve them”). 
 39. Robert J. Michaels, Electric Utility Regulations, CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA ECON., 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/ElectricUtilityRegulation.html [https://perma.cc/QA7D-H6SW] 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2017) (explaining that single lines “minimize[] . . . capital costs and losses to 
electrical resistance per unit of power carried”). 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. 
 42. John S. Rilling, Regulation of Utilities by a Regulator, 23 PUB. SERVICE MAG. 38, 38 (1917) 
(explaining that the service was “of such public character as to make the agency rendering the same a 
public service company . . . impressed with a public interest”). It is interesting to note that “electric 
service to the public started with ice houses” that used “small generating systems . . . for making ice.” 
H. Lester Hooker, The End of Local Regulation—an FPC Goal?, 1963 A.B.A. SEC. PUB. UTIL. L. REP. 
12. Owners of these systems often had spare capacity, leading such owners to “[start] selling some of it 
to their neighbors.” Id.  
 43. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text.  
 44. States began regulating utility rates in 1907. TIMOTHY J. BRENNAN ET AL., A SHOCK TO THE 
SYSTEM: RESTRUCTURING AMERICA’S ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 4 (1996).  
 45. Federal regulation of wholesale electricity rates began in 1935 with Congress’s passage of Part 
II to the Federal Power Act. See generally Dozier A. DeVane, Highlights of Legislative History of the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/9
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“high enough to ensure that utility investors had the opportunity to earn ‘a 
fair rate of return’ on their investments.”46 In doing so, regulators protected 
the public from potential abuses by monopoly owners.47 By the 1980s, 
“there [was] a developing recognition that economic regulation 
accomplishes little in the public interest when it is directed at limiting 
competition.”48 Furthermore, with technological advancements making 
electric generation more and more efficient, Congress passed the Energy 
Policy Act of 1992.49 The Act gave FERC “a clear signal that [Congress] 
would like to see more competition in wholesale electric power markets.”50  
In theory, the principal benefits that are realized from injecting 
competition into the electric industry come from a reallocation of risks.51 
When a utility is heavily regulated, its customers bear the risks of increased 
rates due to the utility’s technology becoming obsolete and/or the utility’s 
capacity exceeding the utility’s anticipated demand.52 In contrast, “[u]nder 
competition, these risks are initially with the owners of the plants—they will 
pay for mistakes or profit from good decisions and management.”53  
Testifying before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of 
the United States Senate in 1995, the Commission’s Chair54 accordingly 
 
 
Federal Power Act of 1935 and the Natural Gas Act of 1938, 14 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 30 (1945–46).  
 46. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 4. Under the traditional rate-making process, a utility’s rate 
of return had to be “commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding 
risks.” FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944). It is important to emphasize that 
regulators merely provided an opportunity rather than a guarantee that utilities would earn a fair return 
on their investments. See Harvey L. Reiter, Competition Between Public and Private Distributors in a 
Restructured Power Industry, 19 ENERGY L.J 333, 337 (1998) (“[T]here is no regulatory compact 
guaranteeing utilities a return allowance . . . .”). That said, “in effect . . . as long as [utilities] operated 
prudently, profit was assured.” Joseph P. Tomain, Traditionally-Structured Electric Utilities in a 
Distributed Generation World, 38 NOVA L. REV. 473, 483 (2014). 
 47. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 4; see also Reiter, supra note 46, at 337–38 (explaining 
that “utilities are regulated because they possess market power and because competition, while still 
valuable, was believed to provide insufficient protection to the public against abuse of that market 
power.”). 
 48. O’Connor et al., supra note 27, at 229 (citing general legislative and regulatory moves to 
remove barriers to competition).  
 49. The advancements, which allowed electricity to be generated in smaller plants at a lower 
production cost naturally contributed to an increase in electricity providers. New York v. FERC, 535 
U.S. 1, 7 (2002). In 1993, the Energy Policy Act was characterized as “the first comprehensive energy 
policy legislation enacted in over a decade.” Donald F. Santa, Jr. & Patricia J. Beneke, Federal Natural 
Gas Policy and the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 14 ENERGY L.J. 1, 1 (1993). In relevant part, the Act 
“further advanced generation deregulation.” David Schraub, Renewing Electricity Competition, 42 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 937, 956 n.78 (2015) (highlighting the Act’s removal of certain barriers to entry).  
 50. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 10.  
 51. See HUNT, supra note 30, at 28–29. 
 52. Id. at 29. 
 53. Id. 
 54. The Commission’s Chair at the time was Elizabeth A. Moler. FERC Electric Utility 
Restructure: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Energy & Nat. Res., 104th Cong. 2 (1995) [hereinafter 
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highlighted FERC’s desire to “ensure a fair and orderly transition from 
regulation to competition.”55 She recognized that consumers should be able 
to enjoy “competitively priced generation” but emphasized that the 
Commission was “not comfortable entirely with promoting competition by 
eliminating regulation” when there was “still a substantial potential . . . [for] 
discriminatory practices in the industry.”56  
The Commissioner indicated that FERC learns of most discriminatory 
practices through industry participants.57 She asserted that although the 
electric generation segment of the industry had become more competitive 
organically, the transmission sector still sometimes prevented customers 
from realizing the benefits of this newfound competition.58 Put differently, 
she claimed that “[w]ith the entry of significant, new third party power 
suppliers, [FERC had] heard an increasing number of complaints that those 
who own[ed] transmission facilities [were] discriminating against these 
third party suppliers.”59 She noted that this development was hardly 
surprising; one could expect utilities that had long enjoyed monopoly power 
to resist competitions and perhaps be “simply unwilling to give up their 
monopoly control over the transmission facilities.”60  
C. Order No. 888’s Shift to Competition 
In a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that preceded Order No. 888, FERC 
echoed many of the concerns that its Commissioner had voiced in the 
previous year.61 At times, FERC went further and found that 
“discriminatory transmission service [was] the foremost barrier to fair 
competition.”62 The Commission’s view was precipitated by “evidence of 
 
 
FERC Hearing] (statement of Elizabeth A. Moler, Chair, Fed. Energy Regulatory Commission). 
Although Moler had served on the Commission since 1988, four “pro-competition candidates” were 
selected to join the Commission in 1993. ISSER, supra note 12, at 135.  
 55. FERC Hearing, supra note 54, at 3. 
 56. Id.  
 57. See id. at 10. Although FERC can bring actions on its own, it is generally a “reactive” 
regulatory body. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 63. 
 58. FERC Hearing, supra note 54, at 3–4. 
 59. Id. at 3. 
 60. Id. at 3–4.  
 61. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access 
Non-discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities: Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public 
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,357 (proposed Mar. 29, 1995).  
 62. Hugh Goodday, Reciprocity: Fair Trade or Free Trade? Challenging American Electricity 
Regulation Under NAFTA, 23 DALHOUSIE J. LEGAL STUD. 130, 132 (2014) (emphasis added); See also 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,357, at 5–6 (“The key to competitive bulk power 
markets is opening up transmission services. . . . [M]arket power through control of transmission is the 
single greatest impediment to competition.”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/9
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pervasive discrimination” in the interstate transmission of electricity63 and 
changes that had emerged in the market as a result of several technological 
advancements.64 While those advancements had contributed to a dramatic 
increase in electric providers and had enabled customers around the United 
States to feasibly purchase electricity produced outside their home states, 
utilities, as the Commissioner had previously mentioned, still retained 
ownership and control of transmission lines that enabled the delivery 
(transmission) of electricity.65 This retention of control, FERC insisted, 
essentially gave utilities the power “to refuse to deliver energy produced by 
competitors or to deliver competitors’ power on terms and conditions less 
favorable than those they appl[ied] to their own transmissions.”66 
Reasoning that pursuant to section 206 of the Federal Power Act, the 
Commission was obligated67 to prevent “unduly discriminatory practices in 
transmission access,”68 FERC issued Order No. 888 in 1996. Mandating that 
utilities functionally unbundle,69 the reforms captured in Order No. 888 
 
 
 63. Entergy Servs., Inc. v. FERC, 375 F.3d 1204, 1205–06 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). 
Though “pervasive,” such discrimination, according to FERC, was limited to the market for wholesale 
electricity. See Ala. Mun. Elec. Auth. v. FERC, 662 F.3d 571, 574–75 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (explaining the 
Supreme Court’s finding that FERC’s decision to limit Order No. 888 to the wholesale market was 
reasonable).  
 64. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 7 (2002). By the adoption of Order No. 888, “[s]mall, 
modularized generation systems c[ould] be manufactured and shipped to locations where either they 
could be plugged into the existing transmission system or they could provide electricity to a single 
consuming unit, such as a large factory. . . . [T]hese new, smaller units c[ould] generate electricity at the 
same low cost as the very large central power stations that were built only a few decades ago.” BRENNAN 
ET AL., supra note 44, at 4. In essence, these advancements “created opportunities for competition [in 
electric generation] even if the transmission segment of electricity remained a natural monopoly.” Katz, 
supra note 35, at 553 n.51. 
 65. New York, 535 U.S. at 8. See generally Tomain, supra note 46, for a discussion on the potential 
implications of distributed generation and self-generation. 
 66. New York, 535 U.S. at 8–9. In the 1990s, California’s failed attempt to completely deregulate 
its electric industry “threw two major utilities into financial distress with Pacific Gas and Electric 
declaring bankruptcy.” Tomain, supra note 46, at 478. This failure highlighted both the complexity of 
complete deregulation and “the continued natural monopoly characteristics of the transmission . . . 
segments” of the electric industry. Id.  
 67. In pertinent part, Section 206 of the FPA, which is codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a), compels 
the Commission to determine the just and reasonable practice and establish such practice through rule-
making whenever the Commission finds that a current practice affecting any “rate, charge, or 
classification, demanded, observed, charged, or collected by any public utility for any transmission or 
sale” subject to its jurisdiction is “unduly discriminatory or preferential[.]” 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2012). 
 68. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access 
Non-discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities: Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public 
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,357 (proposed Mar. 29, 1995). See generally supra 
note 1 for a brief discussion on unduly discriminatory practices.  
 69. In Order No. 888, “FERC defined ‘functional unbundling’ as requiring each utility to state 
separate rates for its wholesale generation, transmission and ancillary services, and to take transmission 
of its own wholesale sales and purchases under a single general tariff applicable equally to itself and to 
others.” New York, 535 U.S. at 11. 
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embodied FERC’s belief that “broader transmission access would facilitate 
more competition.”70 To unbundle, utilities would have to charge separate 
rates for each of their services, rather than a single rate that encompassed 
generation, transmission, and ancillary services. To further facilitate 
competition, FERC imposed a “comparability standard,” which required 
transmission owners to offer services to third parties on the same terms that 
the transmission owners themselves received due to their owning the 
infrastructure.71 As such, the Order sought to level the playing field.  
D. Order No. 888: Mixed Reactions 
Initially welcomed with unbridled enthusiasm, Order No. 888 eventually 
faced many criticisms. In 1998, scholars hailed the order as perhaps the 
biggest move taken to boost competition within the market for wholesale 
electric transmission.72 This enthusiasm was short lived, with commentators 
soon pointing out the order’s voluminous shortcomings.73 An article written 
by former FERC Chief of Staff John S. Moot, for instance, noted the 
concern that Order No. 888 had not solved the problem of undue 
discrimination in the provision of electric service.74 In particular, Moot 
argued that Order No. 888 in many respects lacked “clarity,” a standard he 
suggested “require[d] that the FERC’s rules be known and understood by 
transmission providers and their customers.”75 Moot also advanced that the 
level of transparency76 provided by Order No. 888 could use improvement.77 
Ultimately, he recommended that FERC “adopt clearer guidelines as to 
precisely which violations [would] result in which penalties,” reasoning that 
 
 
 70. Basheda et al., supra note 4, at 352 (explaining the Commission’s rationale behind requiring 
public utilities owning transmission systems to file open access transmission tariffs). In Order No. 888-
A, FERC expressed that Order No. 888 reflected the Commission’s belief that “[t]he only way to 
effectuate competitive markets and remedy discrimination [was] through readily available, non-
discriminatory transmission access.” Order No. 888-A, supra note 14, at 11 (emphasis added). Today, 
“[c]ompetition in wholesale generation markets is legally possible anywhere in the mainland United 
States,” while competition in transmission markets is only possible in a few states. HEMPLING, supra 
note 1, at 75.  
 71. JAMES H. MCGREW, FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION 154 (2d ed. 2009) 
(explaining that “[t]he Commission concluded that the public interest required the elimination of the 
undue discrimination by which transmitting utilities could deny third parties comparable access to their 
transmission systems”).  
 72. See, e.g., Basheda et al., supra note 4, at 351–52. 
 73. See, e.g., John S. Moot, Whither Order No. 888?, 26 ENERGY L.J. 327 (2005).  
 74. See generally Moot, supra note 73.  
 75. Id. at 330.  
 76. Moot defined “transparency” as a consideration of whether one could “tell if the FERC’s rules 
are being followed.” Id. 
 77. Id.  
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greater certainty regarding penalties would in turn reduce various costs 
associated with compliance and enforcement and would encourage public 
utilities to implement greater internal controls.78  
II. THE CURRENT NEED FOR REFORM 
A. Revisiting Order No. 888 in Light of Consolidation Trends 
Ten years after Moot’s article was published, Order No. 888 and its 
successor orders continue to provide uncertain guidance and arguably 
ineffective rules to combat undue discrimination, specifically in the context 
of “hoarding” electric transmission. Admittedly, the question of how big of 
a problem undue discrimination really is remains—as it did in 2005—
“unanswered.”79 Nevertheless, the risk posed by hoarding (as a means of 
undue discrimination) warrants special consideration today as the electric 
utility landscape continues to develop rapidly. In Wither Order No. 888, 
Moot’s concerns about the lack of clarity and transparency in Order No. 888 
were tempered by the fact that Order No. 888 may have encouraged the 
entry of new merchant generators in the years immediately following its 
adoption.80 As such, Moot reasoned that Order No. 888 may have “faired 
[sic] quite well” in serving “as a means to foster the development of 
competitive wholesale markets.”81 
Today, the rise in mergers and acquisitions activity within the electricity 
market should cause renewed and particularized concern. With utilities’ 
operating costs increasing largely because of enhanced environmental 
regulations and rising construction costs, the “traditional operating model 
of building large power generating plants to sell increasing amounts of 
electricity is changing.”82 Rather than investing in infrastructure as was 
 
 
 78. Id. Many other commentators and state regulators criticized Order No. 888 on different 
grounds. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Bringing the Camel into the Tent: State and Federal Power 
over Electricity Transmission, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 71, 88 (2001) (explaining that “[m]any state 
regulators . . . oppose[d] Order 888” on jurisdictional grounds); Reiter, supra note 46, at 345 (criticizing 
Order No. 888’s open access policies for “not address[ing] the need to provide low cost, reliable, retail 
delivery services”).  
 79. Moot, supra note 73, at 331. 
 80. Id. (explaining that “[s]ince Order No. 888 was adopted, new entry by merchant generators has 
flourished”). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Saumya Ajila, Consolidation in the Electric Utilities Industry, VALUE LINE (Mar. 30, 2015), 
http://www.valueline.com/Stocks/Commentaries/Consolidation_In_The_Electric_Utilities_Industry.as
px. Across the board, construction costs have consistently risen since 2011. See RIDER LEVETT 
BUCKNALL, USA REPORT: QUARTERLY CONSTRUCTION COST REPORT 3, 6 (2015).  
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done in the past, utilities have instead turned to consolidation.83  
Under the Federal Power Act (“FPA”), electric utility mergers must be 
authorized by FERC.84 Section 203(a)(4) of the FPA requires the 
Commission to approve a “proposed . . . acquisition, or change in control, 
if [the Commission] finds that the proposed transaction will be consistent 
with the public interest.”85 In deciding whether mergers align with the 
public interest, FERC “examines a merger’s effect on competition.”86  
Despite these safeguards, a 2012 report on the “Race to Consolidate” 
determined that “[i]n the last 10 years, the number of investor-owned 
electric utility holding companies in the United States ha[d] declined from 
69 to 51.”87 The report’s authors predicted that the trend, which had emerged 
in spite of the cumbersome process associated with obtaining regulatory 
approval for mergers and acquisitions,88 would accelerate gradually.89 By 
2020, the authors expect the number of investor-owned electric utility 
holding companies to dip below forty.90  
 
 
 83. Ajila, supra note 82. In addition to heightened environmental regulations and rising 
construction costs, utilities may be turning to consolidation due to the steadily declining demand for 
electricity. See Tomain, supra note 46, at 479. Historically, electric utilities were incentivized to invest 
in infrastructure largely because cost-of-service regulation enabled “companies to recover their actual 
(or prudently-incurred) costs, including the cost of capital.” HUNT, supra note 30, at 426 (defining cost-
of-service regulation). Under this cost-based system of ratemaking, so long as demand for electricity 
increased and the country’s economy continued to expand, a utility’s “building [was] a necessary and 
economically valuable strategy.” Tomain, supra note 46, at 483. Since 1996, however, demand has 
declined in all but two years. Id. at 479.  
 84. “No public utility shall, without first having secured an order of the Commission authorizing 
it to do so . . . merge or consolidate . . . by any means whatsoever . . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 824b(a)(1)(B) 
(2012).  
 85. Id. § 824b(a)(4). In the mid-1990s, scholars complained that FERC’s merger filing 
requirements, which “simply instruct[ed] merging applicants to describe ‘[t]he facts relied upon . . . to 
show that the proposed . . . merger . . . will be consistent with the public interest’” failed to provide 
specific standards for analyzing a proposed merger’s potential effect on competition. John S. Moot, A 
New FERC Policy for Electric Utility Mergers?, 17 ENERGY L.J. 139, 156 (1996) (alterations in original) 
(quoting 18 C.F.R. § 33.2(j) (1995)).  
 86. Mergers and Sections 201 and 203 Transactions, FERC (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.ferc. 
gov/industries/electric/gen-info/mergers.asp. The Commission also considers the mergers effect on 
“rates and regulation, and the potential for cross-subsidization.” Id. In comparison, the Commission does 
not oversee mergers and acquisitions that occur in the natural gas industry. What FERC Does, FERC 
(May 24, 2016), http://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does.asp (outlining the responsibilities of FERC). 
 87. Jack Azagury et al., The Race to Consolidate, FORTNIGHTLY (Sept. 2012), http://www.fort 
nightly.com/fortnightly/2012/09/race-consolidate. 
 88. Ajila, supra note 82. 
 89. Azagury et al., supra note 87; see also Editorial, Utility Companies to Continue Mergers and 
Acquisitions, ELECTRIC LIGHT & POWER (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.elp.com/articles/2013/10/utility-
companies-to-continue-mergers-and-acquisitions.html (explaining the tendency of larger electric 
utilities to address expansion through acquisitions, “while smaller utilities adopt an ‘eat or be eaten’ 
strategy”).  
 90. Azagury et al., supra note 87. A particularly notable recent acquisition occurred July 2012 
when Duke Energy merged with Progress Energy to create the largest electric utility in the United States. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/9
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Another survey similarly identified that in the five-year period preceding 
the 1996 adoption of Order No. 888, the electric utility industry experienced 
seven major utility mergers.91 In comparison, ten such mergers occurred in 
1997 alone,92 while close to fifty mergers have occurred since 1997, an 
average of over thirteen major mergers per five-year period.93 
Thus, although empirical data on the scope of the problem posed by 
undue discrimination remains scant, concern should grow as utilities 
continue to consolidate. Conceivably, large utilities like NextEra Energy 
and Southern Company hold a disproportionate amount of market power,94 
the exertion of which could cause devastating impacts95 within the 
wholesale market of transmission. As the risk of price gouging grows with 
markets consolidating to the verge of monopolization,96 the time has come 
to revisit FERC’s policy regarding the hoarding of transmission capacity.  
 
 
Matthew L. Wald, Duke and Progress Energy Become Largest U.S. Utility, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/business/energy-environment/duke-energy-merger-creates-
largest-us-utility.html; see also Jessica Resnick-Ault, Duke Energy to Buy Progress Energy for $13.7 
Billion, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Jan. 10, 2011, 7:37 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 2011-
01-10/duke-energy-to-buy-progress-energy-for-13-7-billion (detailing the specifics of Duke Energy’s 
then-impending acquisition of Progress Energy). 
 91. Here, major utility mergers are defined as mergers with a target value of over one billion 
dollars. ISSER, supra note 12, at 157.  
 92. Id. at 147. To be fair, 1997’S drastic increase in mergers was largely a result of “utilities 
maneuver[ing] to restructure themselves for the coming competitive market place.” Id.  
 93. Id. at 157. 
 94. “Market power is the ability of a firm to set prices above competitive rates.” BOSSELMAN ET 
AL., supra note 32, at 108. The abuse of market power is a particular concern in the electric utility 
industry as well as other industries that have traditionally been characterized by state-granted monopoly 
power. Although  
[t]he most likely route to market power in today’s electric utility industry lies through 
ownership or control of transmission facilities. . . . market power also may be gained without 
ownership. . . . Entities with contractual control over transmission facilities can withhold 
supply and extract monopoly prices just as effectively as those who control facilities through 
ownership.  
Order No. 888, supra note 2, at 26–27 (emphasis added) (quoting Citizens Power & Light Corp, 48 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,210, at 61,777 (1989)). 
 95. In the early 2000s California experienced an energy crisis largely as a result of market power 
abuses. See generally California’s Electricity Crisis: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Energy & Nat. 
Res., 107th Cong. 27 (2001). At the time, a United States senator described California’s crisis in dire 
terms: “California has serious problems. Shortages. Blackouts. Families sitting in the dark. Traffic lights 
out. People stuck in elevators. Production lines shut down. Utilities on the brink of bankruptcy. 
Stockholders and pension funds suffering major losses.” Id. at 3 (prepared statement of Hon. Frank H. 
Murkowski, Chairman, S. Comm. on Energy & Nat. Res.).  Id. (statement of Hon. Frank H. 
Murkowski, U.S. Senator, Alaska). 
 96. See infra notes 146–148 and corresponding comments.  
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B. Examining Order No. 888: FERC’s Hoarding Policy Sans Definition 
In Order No. 888, the Commission acknowledged the possibility of 
industry participants hoarding transmission capacity.97 In doing so, FERC 
made intermittent references to a general prohibition on the practice. The 
Commission’s first mention of hoarding was made in reference to 
arguments raised by industry participants that FERC had failed to prove that 
undue discrimination was in fact an industry-wide problem.98 Highlighting 
those concerns, FERC cited an instance where a power pool99 had allegedly 
refused to wheel out100 available capacity “on the grounds that sending 
power out of the pool would drive up prices in the pool” as an example of 
the impermissible practice of hoarding.101  
Next, the Commission mentioned hoarding as it related to particular 
instances of unused or unneeded transmission capacity.102 In this context, 
FERC first identified a market participant’s suggestion that the Commission 
adopt a “use-it-or-lose-it” scheme under which transmission customers 
would be required to either use all of the capacity they reserve or lose their 
rights to such capacity.103 Under the proposed scheme, transmission 
providers could potentially reassign the surrendered capacity to other 
customers.104  
FERC noted that several utilities opposed instituting such a scheme.105 
One utility had argued that the approach was “inappropriate” because a 
 
 
 97. Notice of Inquiry, Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Services, 
112 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,299 (Sept. 16, 2005), reprinted at 50 Fed. Reg. 55,796, 55,802 (Sept. 23, 2005) 
(explaining that “In Order No. 888, the Commission acknowledged that hoarding of transmission 
capacity was a possibility.”). 
 98. Order No. 888, supra note 2, at 129. 
 99. Power pools facilitate the transferring of electricity between various utilities. They are typically 
managed from a central location. This structure often entails the “relinquish[ing] certain responsibilities 
to the pool operating office in return for greater economies in operation” for the relevant utilities. ALLEN 
J. WOOD & BRUCE F. WOLLENBERG, POWER GENERATION, OPERATION, AND CONTROL 339 (1984). 
 100. Wheeling refers to the practice of transferring electricity between different utilities. It allows 
utilities that have surplus capacity to “transmit excess power to other utilities with too much demand.” 
Wheeling, INDEPENDENT ENERGY PRODUCERS ASS’N, http://www.iepa.com/wheeling.asp (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2017). Put simply, wheeling involves a third party transmitting electricity over a particular 
company’s power lines. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of 
Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1354 (1998).  
 101. Order No. 888, supra note 2, at 133.  
 102. Id. at 166. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 173. Such reassignment would involve the “original holder . . . conduct[ing] the 
transaction directly with the assignee, but . . . remain[ing] obligated to the transmission provider.” KEVIN 
PORTER, DEP’T OF ENERGY, OPEN ACCESS TRANSMISSION AND RENEWABLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES 
4 (1996) (summarizing Order No. 888).  
 105. Order No. 888, supra note 2, at 167. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/9
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prudent utility that had reserved capacity106 would naturally “seek to sell the 
service it [was] not using so as to recover some portion of its fixed costs.”107 
Similarly, another utility claimed that reservation holders had little incentive 
to hoard capacity because other customers could use the capacity on a non-
firm108 basis during times when reservation holders did not schedule 
power.109 It cautioned that allowing providers to reassign capacity rights 
could “result in undue influence and the exercise of market power.”110 
Another utility that opposed the measure conceded that reassigning 
reservation rights “would help prevent [capacity] hoarding.”111  
After identifying these concerns, FERC discussed the potential of using 
pooling arrangements112 to prevent “improper reservations” as a whole.113 It 
cited a market participant’s belief that a “pooling arrangement could provide 
an incentive to hoarders to release capacity during a shortage.”114 Another 
participant disagreed with the above contention, arguing that “a pooling 
arrangement would [not] prevent capacity hoarding unless nonsequential 
reservations [were] prohibited” as well.115 A final participant insisted that 
“a use-it-or-lose-it rule would be fairer and more effective than pooling.”116 
Once the Commission had highlighted all of the foregoing concerns, it 
issued its conclusions on the issue of unused or unneeded capacity. 
Rejecting a “use-it-or-lose-it” approach, FERC concluded that firm117 
 
 
 106. “For a producer of energy, [reserve capacity] refers to the capacity of a producer to generate 
more energy than the system normally requires. For a transmission company, it refers to the capacity of 
the transmission infrastructure to handle additional energy transport if demand levels rise beyond 
expected peak levels.” Energy Dictionary: Reserve Margin, Reserve Capacity, ENERGYVORTEX.COM, 
https://www.energyvortex.com/energydictionary/reserve_margin__reserve_capacity.html (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2017).  
 107. Order No. 888, supra note 2, at 167. 
 108. Non-firm transmission service refers to service that is “provided on an as-available basis and 
is subject to interruption or curtailment before Firm Transmission Service.” WALT CECIL, MO. PUB. 
SERV. COMM’N, TRANSMISSION SERVICE TYPES 10 (Nov. 5, 2012), http://pubs.naruc.org/pub/ 
5377347A-2354-D714-5155-0E16D3B53538. 
 109. Order No. 888, supra note 2 at 167.  
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 167. Despite its helping prevent hoarding, the utility argued that reassignment would 
hardly “assure efficient use of the full transmission network,” id. at 167, a goal that is central to effective 
utility regulation. 
 112. A pooling arrangement is an agreement between at least two “interconnected electric systems 
to operate on a coordinated basis to achieve economies and/or enhance reliability in supplying their 
respective loads.” 7 C.F.R. § 1717.602 (2015).  
 113. Order No. 888, supra note 2, at 168. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. Order No. 888 also addressed other considerations implicitly related to hoarding, including 
granting a right to first refusal to customers that reserve capacity before others, limiting reservation 
periods, and mandating nonrefundable fees on customers that place advance reservations.  
 117. Firm transmission service refers to service that is usually constantly available even when a 
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transmission customers “should not lose their rights to firm capacity simply 
because they do not use that capacity for certain periods of time.”118 The 
Commission noted that the typical firm customer that has paid to reserve 
capacity “does not use the entire amount of reserved capacity at all 
times.”119  
Despite this widespread practice, the Commission concluded that “[t]his 
does not mean . . . they must permanently return the unused amount to the 
utility.”120 Instead, FERC deferred to the expertise of transmission 
customers, who in the Commission’s view, are “in the best position to know 
the levels of electric energy they will be transmitting and the level of 
flexibility they need in carrying out their transmission activities.”121 FERC 
ultimately concluded that “[i]n the absence of evidence of hoarding or other 
anticompetitive practices, [the Commission] will not limit the amount of 
transmission capacity that a customer may reserve.”122  
In reaching its conclusion, FERC essentially argued that under the 
existing system, transmission customers had little incentive to hoard 
capacity.123 The Commission did, however, recognize that “situations could 
arise in which a customer unlawfully withholds capacity. That is, a 
transmission customer could retain capacity in a way that could have an 
anticompetitive effect.”124  
Due to the apparently low likelihood of such withholding, the 
Commission determined that a generic remedy was currently 
unnecessary.125 Rather, it mandated that “substantial allegations that 
indicate that a transmission customer is withholding scarce capacity in a 
way that has an anticompetitive effect [should] be addressed under section 
 
 
transmission system nears capacity. A utility that buys firm transmission service is “more likely . . . to 
be able to serve all of its customers” year-round. CECIL, supra note 108, at 6–8.  
 118. Order No. 888, supra note 2, at 168 (emphasis added). In addition to rejecting the proposed 
use-it-or-lose-it scheme, the Commission “declined [other] suggested policy measures such as . . . ‘take 
or pay’ charges, imposing nonrefundable fees, or imposing limitations on how far in advance 
reservations for transmission capacity can be made.” PORTER, supra note 104, at 4.  
 119. Order No. 888, supra note 2, at 168. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 168–69. 
 122. Id. at 168 (emphasis added). The Commission also emphasized that firm customers were still 
required to pay relevant reservation charges associated with unused or unneeded transmission capacity. 
Id. at 169; see infra Part III.a (discussing Order 888’s lack of an explicit definition of hoarding).  
 123. Order No. 888, supra note 2, at 169. The Commission claimed that the risk of a transmission 
customer “reserv[ing] capacity and then hold[ing] without using or reassigning it is mitigated” since 
customers stand to benefit economically from selling unscheduled capacity on a non-firm basis or 
otherwise making it available to the market. Id. 
 124. Id. (emphasis added); see infra Part III.a.  
 125. Order No. 888, supra note 2, at 169–70.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/9
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206.”126 If a customer was found guilty of unlawful withholding, the 
Commission might, pursuant to section 206, prohibit such customer from 
reserving capacity and “return the capacity reservation right to the 
transmission operator.”127  
There are several problems associated with the above policy. First, an 
explicit definition of hoarding is absent from FERC’s hands-off approach 
to curbing the practice.128 Second, Order No. 888 provides limited guidance 
on how proven instances of hoarding should be addressed in the future. As 
such, FERC’s current hoarding policy, which emanates primarily from 
Order No. 888, lacks both clarity and transparency (as defined by Moot).129 
Lastly, FERC’s decision to reject a use-it-or-lose it approach in favor of its 
uncertain remedial approach, is incompatible with today’s utility 
landscape.130 The Commission should issue a clarification of the first two 
issues and revisit its approach to hoarding, in light of recent utility 
consolidations.  
III. DEFINITION AND APPLICATION 
A. Defining Hoarding: Order No. 888 
Without an express definition for hoarding, a risk emerges that 
transmission providers and their customers may not know or understand the 
rules surrounding the practice.131 As a result, even well-intentioned 
customers might not realize they are violating FERC policy by failing to 
release a given amount of transmission capacity.132 Explicitly defining 
hoarding is thus a requisite early step to achieving an effective policy that 
ultimately protects the public from unjustified price increases.  
 
 
 126. Id. at 170. Essentially, the Commission instructed market participants to continue to file 
complaints with FERC if “evidence that a transmission customer [was] hoarding transmission capacity” 
arose. PORTER, supra note 104, at 4; see supra note 67, for a description of the pertinent statutory 
language of section 206 of the FPA.  
 127. Order No. 888, supra note 2, at 170. The Commission insisted that its approach struck a balance 
between the interests of not having capacity go unused “without forcing customers to demonstrate need 
or to reveal details of individual transactions.” Id. 
 128. Seemingly, the only attempt FERC has made to explicitly define hoarding comes in the natural 
gas context, where FERC labels ‘hoarding’ an “uneconomic retention.” Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline 
Rate Design, 47 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,295 (May 30, 1989). In Order No. 888, FERC merely states that hoarding 
concerns will be addressed by the Commission on a case-by-case basis. Order No. 888, supra note 2.  
 129. Moot, supra note 73, at 330 (defining “clarity” and “transparency”). 
 130. See discussion supra Part II.a. 
 131. See Moot, supra note 73, at 330. 
 132. See id. at 334 (explaining how the lack of an industry standard for calculating available 
transmission capacity “makes it difficult to determine whether any particular method violates Order No. 
888’s mandate to provide transmission service on a nondiscriminatory basis”). 
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Through an examination of Order No. 888, one can develop a rough 
understanding of what actions, under FERC’s view, constitute capacity 
hoarding (in the context of unused or unneeded capacity). FERC’s example 
of the power pool that refused to wheel out available capacity because doing 
so would affect its bottom line clearly illustrates that an entity that 
intentionally withholds capacity in order to maximize its returns is guilty of 
hoarding.133 It is also somewhat clear that the Commission is particularly 
concerned with hoarding if the practice is done when capacity is scarce.134 
FERC’s statement that a firm customer should not lose its rights to firm 
capacity solely because it does not use that capacity for certain periods of 
time also indicates that hoarding amounts to something greater than merely 
holding onto unused capacity.135 As such, the Commission’s policy of not 
limiting reservation rights to capacity “in the absence of evidence of 
hoarding or other anticompetitive practices”136 makes some sense.  
Put together, these articulations indicate that FERC considers hoarding 
an anticompetitive practice that involves an electric utility withholding 
transmission capacity from third parties. While intentional withholding to 
exert market power is clearly hoarding, simply holding onto unused 
capacity is permissible. The distinction between the two ends of the 
spectrum must result from the intentional act to withhold, the existence of 
market conditions that make withholding harmful, or a consideration of both 
of these components.  
FERC has previously alluded to intent being a requisite aspect of actions 
that are unduly discriminatory.137 In Order No. 2000, FERC cautions 
however, that “instances of actual discrimination may be undetectable in a 
non-transparent market and, in any event, it is often hard to determine, on 
an after-the-fact basis, whether an action was motivated by an intent to favor 
affiliates or simply reflected the impartial application of operating or 
technical requirement[s].”138 This observation confirms that the intentional 
act of the pool that refused to wheel is tantamount to an easy case of 
hoarding. At the same time, FERC’s observation emphasizes that requiring 
 
 
 133. See discussion supra Part II.b. 
 134. See discussion supra Part II.b. 
 135. See discussion supra Part II.b. 
 136. Order No. 888, supra note 2, at 168. 
 137. See Order No. 2000, Regional Transmission Organizations, 89 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,285 (Dec. 20, 
1999) [hereinafter Order No. 2000].  
 138. Id. at 36 (emphasis added); c.f. Joe D. Pace & John H. Landon, Introducing Competition into 
the Electric Utility Industry: An Economic Appraisal, 3 ENERGY L.J. 1, 19 (1982) (explaining that FERC 
policy had recently decided that “the intent of the wholesale supplier was not relevant in determining 
either the existence of a price squeeze or whether a price squeeze, once found, was undue”). 
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a finding that a utility withheld its capacity with the intent to favor the utility 
(or its affiliate) over third parties is perhaps impossible in practice. 
Intent is routinely measured by an objective standard.139 Imposing such 
a standard in the utility industry would be arduous.140 The arguments raised 
by various market participants in opposition to the proposed use-it-or-lose-
it scheme underscore the difficulty with making an “objective” 
determination that a utility has withheld capacity with intent.141 Take, for 
example, the argument that any “prudent” utility would attempt “to sell the 
service it [was] not using so as to recover some portion of its fixed costs.”142 
If this statement were accurate, it would lead to the conclusion that a utility 
acts imprudently whenever it withholds unused capacity. Arguably, one 
could equate imprudence to intentional action, or at least reasonably infer 
that a utility acts with intent if it undertakes the imprudent action of 
withholding capacity. This result, however, would conflict with FERC’s 
explicit determination that holding onto unused capacity alone does not 
amount to the impermissible practice of hoarding.143 Moreover, as FERC 
admits, detecting intentionality is difficult because a utility that consciously 
violates FERC policy seldom leaves a paper trail behind.144  
Thus, FERC’s definition of hoarding must rest either entirely on the 
market conditions that might make withholding capacity particularly 
harmful or some combination of such conditions and the motivation behind 
a utility’s action. FERC’s conclusion implies that the hoarding inquiry 
should focus primarily on the anticompetitive effect that withholding 
transmission “could have” on a given market.145 The actual effect a utility’s 
withholding ultimately has on the market is seemingly irrelevant to the 
inquiry.  
An environment where a number of utilities have the ability to “set prices 
above competitive rates”146 (i.e., where utilities possess market power), 
suffers particular harm when a utility with that ability withholds capacity. 
Naturally, in such markets there is an inherent risk that prices could increase 
 
 
 139. See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 154 (2004) (explaining that “of course subjective 
intent is always determined by objective means”). 
 140. HUNT, supra note 30, at 104 (“How do you know whether a plant that is not running at all is 
out of service for physical reasons, or being withheld deliberately to raise the price? This is a question 
of intention, and unless there is a string of e-mails saying ‘forget about maintaining the sucker’ there 
may be no way to tell.”). 
 141. See discussion supra Part II.b. 
 142. Order No. 888, supra note 2, at 167. 
 143. See discussion supra Part II.b. 
 144. See HUNT, supra note 30, at 104.  
 145. See discussion supra Part II.b.  
 146. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 108.  
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precipitously. Sally Hunt offers the following insight in reference to a utility 
exercising market power by unilaterally withdrawing its capacity:147  
Of course you take a loss on the capacity you unilaterally withdraw. 
If there is freedom of entry, a competitor can replace your capacity 
and make your behavior unprofitable, but this may take a while. In 
markets where entry takes time, the secret of successfully exercising 
market power is to have enough other units that the increased price 
for your other units’ output more than makes up for the loss on the 
withdrawn capacity. To make this work, in general you have to be 
big, compared with the size of the market.148 
As Sally Hunt’s insight demonstrates, the bigger a utility is in relation to its 
market, the more likely its withholding of capacity is intended to alter 
market prices. Over the last decade, various articles have “noted the 
existence of market power in U.S. electricity markets . . . including PJM, 
ISO-New England, [and] New York ISO.”149 PJM, ISO-New England, and 
New York ISO are known as Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs), 
which are voluntarily formed entities that “administer the transmission grid 
on a regional basis throughout North America.”150 One of the key required 
functions of an RTO is to monitor regional markets “to identify . . . market 
power abuses.”151 
Arguably, the Commission was implicitly referring to market power 
when it insisted that “firm transmission customers . . . should not lose their 
rights to firm capacity simply because they do not use that capacity for 
certain periods of time.”152 Such a reference would underscore FERC’s 
belief that hoarding is particularly problematic if it occurs when 
transmission capacity is scarce. 
Despite the difficulty with determining whether a utility withheld 
capacity with the intent to exert market power, FERC’s wheeling utility 
example153 indicates that intentionality is still a relevant consideration. With 
this in mind, this Note offers the following definition, which is based on a 
complete reading of Order No. 888:  
 
 
 147. The scenario explained by Hunt (a transmission provider unilaterally withdrawing its own 
capacity from the market) is different from, but analogous to, a transmission customer withholding 
unused reserved capacity from third parties.  
 148. HUNT, supra note 30, at 90. 
 149. ISSER, supra note 12, at 448.  
 150. Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO), FERC, 
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp (Oct. 20, 2016). 
 151. Regional Transmission Organizations, 18 C.F.R. § 35.34(k)(6) (2015). 
 152. Order No. 888, supra note 2, at 168 (emphasis added).  
 153. See discussion supra Part II.b.  
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Capacity hoarding refers to an electric utility’s retention of 
transmission capacity when such utility possesses market power or 
otherwise has an intention to exert market power through its retention 
of such capacity.  
Here, the actual presence of market power and the intent to exert market 
power are two alternate elements.  
B. Defining Hoarding: Applying Preceding Scholarship 
Although scholars have seldom defined capacity hoarding in the 
American context, European scholars have defined the term in various 
articles.154 An article addressing the role of the European Union’s 
competition rules in shaping the continent’s electricity markets defines 
capacity hoarding as “the withholding of transmission capacity through 
excessive capacity reservations in order to prevent or hinder 
competition.”155 A second article analyzing commitment decisions in the 
European energy sector defines capacity hoarding as “a strategy by which 
companies aim to keep transport capacity on their gas or electricity network 
for themselves.”156 The article notes further that “capacity hoarding is seen 
as a sub-category of the concept of refusal to supply” that focuses on 
“’whether’ capacity is offered.”157 Also in the European Union context, a 
third article describes capacity hoarding as “refusing to grant third parties 
access to capacity in the network.”158  
 
 
 154. See, e.g., Luis Aníbal Avilés Pagán, The Role of the European Union's Competition Rules in 
Shaping the Electric Energy Markets in Europe, 82 REVISTA JURÍDICA U.P.R. 85, 116 (footnote omitted) 
(2013) (describing proceedings against a Czech utility accused of “incurring in capacity hoarding of its 
transmission network in an effort to prevent the entry of third parties into the wholesale market of 
electricity”). Indeed, capacity hoarding is far from a uniquely American practice. Scholars have 
identified “evidence that exercise of market power in the United Kingdom has taken place through 
capacity withholding: at high-demand times the two large firms in the United Kingdom appear to have 
made some of their capacity unavailable in order to raise the market-clearing price.” Severin Borenstein, 
James Bushnell & Steven Stoft, The Competitive Effects of Transmission Capacity in a Deregulated 
Electricity Industry, 31 RAND J. ECON. 294, 308 (2000) (citing Frank A. Wolak & Robert H. Patrick, 
The Impact of Market Rules and Market Structure on the Price Determination Process in the England 
and Wales Electricity Market (Univ. of Cal. Energy Inst., Working Paper No. PWP-047, 1997), 
https://ei.haas.berkeley.edu/research/papers/PWP/pwp047.pdf)).  
 155. Pagán, supra note 154, at 116 n.127.  
 156. Michael Hofmann, Commitment Decisions in the European Energy Sector–Implementation of 
Sector-Specific Regulation via Competition Law, 2014 EUR. NETWORKS L. & REG. Q. 131, 135 (2014). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Barbora Hrabčáková & Tomáš Lipták, EU Legislation on the Electricity Market: Introducing 
Competition. Interaction Between Sector-Specific Regulation and EU Competition Rules. Third 
Legislative Package., 13 COMMON L. REV. 62, 66 (2014); see also Per Hellström et al., Remedies in 
European Antitrust Law, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 57 (2009) (defining capacity hoarding as “refusal to 
grant access to capacity available on the transport network”). 
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These characterizations, although somewhat different from one another, 
seem compatible with the definition this Note identifies.159 Common in each 
of the characterizations is the concept of refusal, which implies an element 
of intent involved in the practice of hoarding electric transmission. The 
characterizations, however, do not uniformly require a utility to intend a 
particular outcome.  
The second characterization, for instance, merely requires that a utility 
“aim” to keep capacity for itself.160 Under the first definition, that intention 
alone is likely insufficient. The first characterization instead explicitly 
requires an intention to “prevent or hinder competition.”161 The third 
characterization of capacity hoarding implies, at the very least, that a utility 
must intentionally withhold its capacity.162 This last characterization, 
however, fails to mention whether the motivation behind the utility’s 
withholding is relevant to the inquiry. 
Despite their differences, each characterization describes an occurrence 
that could conceivably amount to unlawful withholding under the Order No. 
888 concept of hoarding. The second characterization amounts to the easy 
case of a utility acting with the specific intent of exerting market power. In 
this situation, the utility has hoarded capacity even if the utility never 
actually possessed market power. Essentially, this scenario is akin to the 
wheeling utility that FERC references in Order No. 888.163 The other two 
characterizations focus on the act of withholding, rather than the potential 
outcome of such withholding. As such, they seem at odds with FERC’s clear 
instruction that holding onto certain capacity alone does not constitute 
hoarding. Essentially, they ignore market conditions, a feature this Note 
imposed in the definition established earlier.164 
The definition that emerges from a critical reading of the Commission’s 
Order is therefore more comprehensive than any of the European market-
based characterizations alone. It is important to emphasize that this 
definition, although more comprehensive, still comports with the ideas 
expressed in preceding scholarship165 and with the probable intent behind 
 
 
 159. See discussion supra Part III.a.  
 160. Hofmann, supra note 156, at 135. 
 161. Pagán, supra note 154, at 116 n.127.  
 162. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “refusal” as “the declination of a request or demand, or the 
omission to comply with some requirement of law, as the result of a positive intention to disobey.” 
Refusal, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).  
 163. See discussion supra Part II.b.  
 164. See discussion supra Part II.b. 
 165. See, e.g., Pagán, supra note 154, at 116 n.127. 
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FERC’s prohibitive policy.166 
Furthermore, the definition outlined in this Note recognizes that a utility 
might withhold available transmission capacity from the market for 
legitimate reasons. For instance, a utility that does not possess market power 
might prudently withhold capacity for reliability-based reasons. Since the 
prospect of such action adversely affecting market prices is slim (and the 
utility has no anticompetitive intention), it seems appropriate to allow the 
utility’s withholding to remain unpunished.  
Moreover, the definition excludes an inquiry into whether a utility’s 
withholding had an actual and measurable effect on the market from the 
equation altogether.167 This approach underscores the recognition that 
“[t]here is no consensus about how to model market power in electricity 
markets.”168 Determining whether a utility’s action has a real and tangible 
effect on market conditions is thus a futile endeavor; it would be wholly 
impractical to demand that FERC determine the precise effect a utility’s 
action had on prices before holding the utility accountable.169  
With this definition, one can revisit FERC’s treatment of unused or 
unneeded capacity under Order No. 888. Keeping the increase in electric 
utility consolidations in mind, FERC should expressly reassess its approach 
to the use-it-or-lose-it scheme advocated by various market participants in 
Order No. 888.170 The Commission might look to the American gas industry 
for guidance. In terms of general regulation, the United States’ natural gas 
industry has followed a similar trajectory to the electricity industry.  
Similar to the market for wholesale electricity, the natural gas industry 
was once heavily regulated171 From the 1950s through the 1970s, however, 
the Commission struggled to ascertain how much federal regulation within 
the industry was appropriate.172 In 1954, the Supreme Court decided Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin,173 requiring the Federal Power Commission 
 
 
 166. See Order No. 2000, supra note 137. 
 167. See discussion supra Part II.b.  
 168. ISSER, supra note 12, at 451.  
 169. See id. at 275 (explaining that “[t]he controversy over the exercise of market power in 
California illustrated the complexity of identifying and quantifying the existence and impact of such 
behavior.”) (emphasis added).  
 170. See discussion supra Part II.a.  
 171. PAUL W. MACAVOY, THE NATURAL GAS MARKET: SIXTY YEARS OF REGULATION AND 
DEREGULATION 2 (2000) (explaining that regulation of the natural gas industry was aimed at “goal of a 
secure low-cost supply”).  
 172. See generally id. 
 173. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
1366 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:1343 
 
 
 
 
(FPC)174 to regulate wellhead prices of natural gas.175 The resulting 
regulations, which were implemented in the late 1960s, 176 quickly led to a 
drastic reduction in prices177 that ultimately contributed towards widespread 
“natural gas shortages in the 1970s.”178 To address these shortages, the 
Commission subsequently deregulated prices associated with production 
from new gas reserves.179 This strategy proved just as ineffective. “By 
continuing the regulation of prices for production out of old reserves . . . the 
commission forced deregulated prices for new supplies to . . . artificially 
high levels . . . .”180 This increase in price, analogous to the precipitous price 
increase that encouraged the adoption of Order No. 888, subsequently led 
to gas surpluses in the mid-1980s.181  
Since the 1980’s, America’s natural gas industry has undergone several 
significant changes that are not too dissimilar from the electricity industry. 
Among these changes, the Commission no longer regulates wellhead prices 
and “interstate pipelines no longer take ownership of the natural gas 
commodity; instead they offer only the transportation component, which is 
still under federal regulation.”182 Regulators now require “open access to 
pipeline space for distributors and consumers.”183 As a result, “[t]he natural 
gas industry today . . . is much more open to competition and choice.”184 
In the gas industry, gas pipeline contracts are analogous to capacity 
reservations in the electricity industry.185 FERC regulates the prices of such 
contracts, “but the contracts are renewable virtually in perpetuity, and the 
capacity can be sublet on competitive terms.”186 These conditions make the 
 
 
 174. The FPC, FERC’s predecessor, was established in 1935 with the passage of the Federal Power 
Act, which initially “gave the FPC rate and accounting jurisdiction over wholesale sales and transmission 
of electric in interstate commerce.” A Salute: 75 Years for the FPC and FERC, 16 ENERGY L.J. 293, 294 
(1995). In 1938, Congress expanded the FPC’s jurisdiction to natural gas companies. Id.  
 175. MACAVOY, supra note 171, at 2 (describing the holding and aftermath of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Phillips Petroleum Co.).  
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Industry and Market Structure, NATURALGAS.ORG (Sept. 20, 2013), http://naturalgas. 
org/business/industry/. 
 179. MACAVOY, supra note 171, at 2. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Industry and Market Structure, supra note 178.  
 182. Id. (describing recent developments in America’s natural gas industry). This development is 
similar to the deregulation and functional unbundling of vertically integrated electric utilities. See 
generally MICHAELS, supra note 23 (detailing the restructuring of the electricity industry).  
 183. MACAVOY, supra note 171, at 4. 
 184. Industry and Market Structure, supra note 178 (describing recent developments in America’s 
natural gas industry).  
 185. See discussion supra Part II.b.  
 186. HUNT, supra note 30, at 207. 
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pipeline market “very competitive.”187 In essence, holders of gas pipeline 
contracts “have a ‘property right’ to the pipeline capacity.”188 In response, 
the industry has adopted a “use-it-or-lose-it” feature to curb “potential 
monopolization of the pipeline by holders of contracts.”189 Under this 
scheme, holders are required to use gas each day. In the event that they fail 
to do so, their contracts are reassigned.190 This system, rather successful in 
the gas industry, should be replicated in wholesale markets for electricity.  
A prudent utility will likely take hoarding seriously if it risks losing its 
reservation rights. Certainly, utilities that do not have market power or an 
intention to exert market power should not lose their reservation rights 
simply because they hold on to capacity for too long. Only those who hoard, 
under the expressed definition in this Note, should lose their rights.  
At first glance, this modified use-it-or-lose-it approach seems to mimic 
FERC’s statement that “[i]n the absence of evidence of hoarding or other 
anticompetitive practices, [the Commission] will not limit the amount of 
transmission capacity that a customer may reserve.”191 It is different, 
however. This approach mandates that where the Commission has evidence 
of hoarding, it shall restrict the amount of transmission capacity a customer 
may reserve. The definition of hoarding established in this Note enables the 
implementation of such a policy. 
By way of the foregoing definition, the proposed use-it-or-lose-it 
approach has both clarity and transparency.192 The approach is clear because 
the definition specifies that the presence of market power or an intention to 
otherwise exert market power through the retention of transmission capacity 
will be considered capacity hoarding. Thus, transmission providers and their 
customers know when withholding capacity constitutes hoarding and are 
similarly aware that reservation rights will be restricted if and when capacity 
is hoarded.193 In a similar vein, the approach is transparent because the 
definition enables market participants to tell “if the FERC’s rules [on 
hoarding transmission capacity] are being followed.”194  
 
 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. They also pay nominal usage charges for operating costs incurred by a given pipeline. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 211. 
 191. Order No. 888, supra note 2, at 168 (emphasis added). The Commission also emphasized that 
firm customers were still required to pay relevant reservation charges associated with unused or 
unneeded transmission capacity. Id. at 169.  
 192. See discussion supra Part I.d.  
 193. See Moot, supra note 73, at 330.  
 194. See id. 
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C. Resolution and Conclusion 
To be sure, there is value in articulating a policy that is sufficiently broad 
to afford FERC discretion in policing instances of hoarding.195 That said, a 
definition that specifically references intent while still allowing FERC the 
ability to construe certain terms broadly or narrowly is optimal. For 
instance, in the workable definition established in this Note, FERC is free 
to determine the threshold for “retention,” the meaning of “market 
power,”196 and the exact contours of the market for electric transmission. 
The widely held concern that Order No. 888 has not solved the problem 
of undue discrimination in the provision of electric transmission service is 
well founded. However, in the context of FERC’s policy against capacity 
hoarding, it is a stretch to assert that Order No. 888 actually frustrates 
FERC’s avowed purpose. While admittedly some degree of discretion will 
make it harder for utilities to comply with and for FERC to detect violations 
to the hoarding policy, a level of uncertainty and ambiguity prevents 
participants from finding creative ways to legally offend FERC’s articulated 
policy (by acting outside of a meticulously defined rule).  
It is crucial that FERC at least clarify whether the act of “hoarding” 
includes an element of intent. In this regard, a comprehensive definition that 
identifies whether hoarding requires a general intent to withhold 
transmission (a requirement that is unlikely after a careful reading of Order 
No. 888), or a specific intent to manipulate market conditions, or no intent 
at all is an imperative first step. With an appropriate definition in place, 
FERC can effectively revisit the policies outlined in Order No. 888 with a 
keen eye on developments within the electricity industry.197  
The definition198 and the use-it-or-lose-it approach199 offered in this Note 
assure a level of certainty, consistency, and predictability with FERC’s 
treatment of capacity hoarding, a notable form of undue discrimination.  
Sandy Kugbei
 
 
 195. Note that defining a policy in such terms inevitably gives the utility a degree of discretion as 
well. Such discretion, even if small, will provide opportunities for undue discrimination. Id. 
 196. My proposition considers market power as “the ability of a firm to set prices above competitive 
rates.” BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 108. But, “a serious question, which has not been resolved, 
is what exactly constitutes market power in an electricity market.” ISSER, supra note 12, at 451. FERC 
“has no hard and fast rule” for evaluating market dominance. HUNT, supra note 30, at 314. 
 197. See discussion supra Part II.a. 
 198. See discussion supra Part III.a.  
 199. See discussion supra Part III.b.  
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